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COMMENTARY
by Mr. William P. McKeown*
A S THE SOLE private practitioner from Canada on this panel this
afternoon, albeit a somewhat tainted one, and in view of the fact there
were no private practitioners on the panel this morning, I feel an obligation
to play the role of the devil's advocate to a certain extent. I should state that
in this field it is easier to criticize than to propose solutions. Having stated
this, let me put it bluntly that the problems which have arisen between the
United States and Canada have come about because each of the govern-
ments have different departments advocating different solutions, and the
private companies are left in the position of having to make the choice of
breaking one or more laws in one of the countries, or as was stated this morn-
ing by Mr. Baker, the choice of choosing between Canadian or American
jails.
It concerns me that the Canadian government is proposing legislation
under Stage II of the Competition Policy proposals to allow it to enter into an
antitrust agreement with the United States, which in and of itself is a good
thing, but at the same time another department of the government (probably
the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce) may be encouraging
agreements between companies which are contrary to the antitrust laws.
However, they would not be doing so under openly stated government policy.
This is the problem with Mr. Stanford's arguments of this morning. He com-
plained about the United States antitrust authorities going after Canadian
companies carrying out government policy. However, in using the alleged
uranium cartel as an example, there does not appear to have been an openly
announced government policy at the time the uranium cartel was in opera-
tion. Surely, it is unreasonable to expect that American antitrust authorities
or courts are going to respect a retroactive announcement of Canadian
government policy. If the Canadian government wishes to openly advocate
cartels at the time they are formed and obtain the passage of the necessary
legislation from Parliament, then this would be a sovereign act which would
provide a defence to any antitrust or combines prosecution in the United
States or Canada.
At the present time, the Canadian government in Stage II of Competi-
tion Policy is proposing to permit specialization agreements under certain cir-
cumstances where they are approved by the Competition Board. These
specialization agreements will be contrary to American law in some situations.
It is not good enough to hope that the American authorities will take no ac-
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tion in such circumstances. The government needs to cary out negotiations
with the United States now so the companies will know that their specializa-
tion agreements are valid in both Canada and the United States. It is not suf-
ficient to let the companies get approval for the specialization agreements
and hope that the United States courts will recognize the approval of the
Competition Board as a valid defence to any antitrust action. My bias is in
favour of expanding the antitrust or competition law jurisdiction but not at
the expense of private companies. Governments must negotiate international
agreements which offer protection to companies who comply with their own
national legislation.
Since it is unacceptable for governments to propose secret cartels, I also
believe it is improper for private companies to enter into cartel arrangements.
This is why I favour the new and strenthened sections 32.1 and 32.11 found
in Bill C-42. However, we should realize that we pay a price for sections such
as these since Canada will be a less desirable place for investment by multi-
national firms. Although section 32.1 does not apply to agreements which are
between affiliated companies only, it does apply when there may be only one
non-affiliated company involved.
However, I would like to close by reiterating my concern that the govern-
ments do not try to make scapegoats out of the private companies. I fully
support the proposals for Stage II in the international area, but the federal
government must act as one in order to ensure that companies that comply
with the Canadian law are not attacked under the United States antitrust
laws.
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